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In an environment of growing globalisation the role of territories and its competitiveness is of 
increasing relevance. Regional and local governments in addition to other public and private 
actors concern about providing the conditions that make attractive their countries, regions or 
cities for productive activities and in so doing they get involved in a competition with other 
territories. Even though competition involves the actions and/or interest of various actors, by 
and large, local government and policy are regarded to play a central role. Local governments 
may use programs and apply funds, which are available as a result of national or regional 
policy, to attend to local interests. But local governments’ actions depend to a large extent on 
their  capability  and  financial  means. This paper  emphasises the  role of  local  government 
action in territorial competition and presents a case to assess the impact of local financial 
capacity on the competitive results of Mexican regions. The federal government in Mexico 
provides  most of the  financial  support  to  states and municipalities on an ongoing basis 
through  transfers  supporting  specific  policy  areas  or  unconditional  transfers.  The 
methodology proposed will develop a series of performance indicators for Mexican regions 
and  use  a multivariate analysis  to  assess  the  influence  of  conditional  and  unconditional 
transfers, and own revenue, while controlling for federal public investment. The period of 
study is between 1996 and 2006 which includes most years when Mexico has been formally 
integrated to the North American region.   
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Territorial competition can be defined as a process in which territories, by means of diverse 
public and private actors, establish a variety of strategies and follow different actions in order 
to promote themselves in domestic and international markets, attract resources – in the form 
of public finance, private investment and human resources-, or increase their popularity and 
votes to a higher extent than their competitors, having the critical aim of improving their 
revealed economic competitiveness. The roots of this concept is frequently associated with a 
reversal of the orientation of spatial policies from nationally based top-down regional policies 
towards local bottom-up formulations which prioritised economic efficiency at the local level 
over spatial equity and cohesion at the national scale (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Chien, 2008). 
The idea of territories competing at the sub national scale expanded and gained relevance at 
the international level where territories of different countries compete due to the contextual 
changing  environment  where  there  is  increasing  economic,  social  and  political 
interdependence.  Under  a  pervasive  competitive  environment  is c ommonplace  that 
governments at various territorial levels, in addition to other public and private institutions,
concern about providing the conditions that make attractive their territories. They want to 
attract resources of various kinds, production and consumption in order to foster economic 
growth and development. Such competition involves the actions of multiple actors but it is 
through local public administrations and policy makers that other actors will try to establish 
strategies and take action for the developmentof competitive attractiveness. 
There is widespread conceptual and empirical literature on the different aspects of territorial 
competition  being  some  representative  contributions  the  works  of  Cheshire  and  Gordon
(1998), Cheshire (1999), Budd (1998), Chien and Gordon (2008), Chien (2008) and the books 
of  Cheshire  and  Gordon (1995)  and  Batey and Friederich  (2000).  Cheshire  and  Gordon
(1998),  Cheshire (1999), Budd (1998), Chien and Gordon (2008), Chien (2008) and Batey 
and Friederich (2000) offer a rich background on the debate about the conceptualisation of 
territorial competition. Batey and Friederich’s (2000) book include a significant effort in the 
construction  of  a  theory  of  territorial  competition  while  Chien  and  Gordon  (2008)  also 
provide important elements in this regard. On the other hand, in varying degrees all the above 
contributions add aspects of empirical analysis or evidence. 
Regarding the theoretical  foundations of territorial  competition  Chien  and  Gordon  (2007) 
raise the question of the actual existence of a satisfactory model of analysis and about the 
generalisability of such model in a setting different to the United States (US) and Western 
Europe for which initial analyses were undertaken. They consider that territorial competitioncan take many forms depending on different institutional factors and contexts. Therefore a
framework  for  explanation  can  be  generalised  if  it  allows  for  variable  kinds  of  actors, 
interests, objectives, means and strategies that are given by different contexts. The empirical 
product from such general scheme is different types of competition.  
This paper  is concerned  with  addressing  a particular  case  of  territorial  competition  and 
exploring the nature of the relationship of some specific aspects of the institutional context 
with the outcomes of competition. Specifically we propose to analyse the significance of local 
governments’ financial capacity on the competitive results of regions in Mexico. We select 
this country because of the significant opening up of its economy in the last three decades, the 
strong  regional  disparities and the semi-developed nature of  its economy. The particular 
contextual elements  in this case are given by the  characteristics of  the  federal system  of 
transfers and the ways in which this determines the financial capacity of local governments 
for policy implementation and strategic action in a globalising scenario. The methodology 
consist of statistical analysis considering the 32 administrative regions for which performance 
results, in terms of productivity, foreign investments, population attraction and a competition
index, will be associated with the  different components of regional revenue. We propose to 
use discriminant  analysis  to see how the independent  variables  influence  the grouping of 
regions according to their performance.  
In  next  section  we present  briefly  the  literature  on  various  approaches  to  territorial 
competition which stress de role of local governments and regional policy. In section II we
include a review regarding the liberalisation process in Mexico, depict the functioning of 
territorial  competition  in  that  country  and  evaluate  some  performance  indicators at the 
regional level. Then there is a description of the federal system in Mexico and the nature of 
regional revenues. In section IV we analyse the empirical significance of federal transfers on 
territorial competition of regional performance. We conclude with some final remarks.   
I. Local government, governance and territorial competition 
Local and regional governments have undergone significant increase of responsibility in the 
operation and administration of their territories. Efforts on their part have been required in an 
attempt to create better conditions to attract and retain residential actors, resources, financing, 
investment, and all the potential demanders for a territory. Mainly those who are elected by 
local people have to develop newstructures and forms to manage their territories. This has 
derived greatly from the tendency to decentralisation by which regional strategies and policies 
can focus on regional/local efforts to foster socio-economic development (Constantin, 1999). Also through globalisation local and regional governments have faced a series of challenges. 
In the global context territories exploit in different degrees their decentralised powers and 
resources in order to reach and advantageous position in the world economy (Chien, 2008). In 
so doing they have to apply increasing proportions of resources and competences in order to 
strive  for  local  economic  development. Competition with  other  territories has  been  a 
practicable strategy in their aim of improving performance and image (Mäding, 2006).
In theory, territorial competition is concerned with local efficiency and effectiveness through 
a bottom-up process. The action  of  a variety  of  local  actors,  the  government having  an 
essential part to play, is what set in motion this competitive behaviour. By and large, local 
government and regional development policy are regarded to play a central role in regional 
competition meaning that the competitive success of regions and cities cannot be achieved 
without the active action of local governments. Chien (2008) calls attention to “the emergence 
of local entrepreneurial governances” resulting from the “territorial restructuring” of local 
responses to the challenges and crises presented by the changing global environment. This is a 
broader perspective in which the involvement of other relevant local actors collectively with 
local governments is crucial. The term strategic governance for territorial competition is used 
to describe this set of local actors, their participation and their competitive actions.     
Actors, motivations and means of competition
Local governance is characterised as formal or informal public and private coalitions that 
work together to formulate and implement policies and strategies. They involve a variety of 
internal actors: governmental officials, various arms of government, political parties, private 
firms, unions, labour organisations, non-governmental organisations, religious institutions, the 
media,  universities,  cultural  and  sport  associations,  self-employed  professionals  among 
others. In many instances, there are networks of public and private groups whose interests are 
highly involved in the local economy and politics. Together these self-interested actors can 
collectively influence the decision-making processes of planning while advance their personal 
political or material interests. Taken as a whole, their motivations and objectives are related to
the creation of new and better spaces of production and consumption as well as the searching 
out of more and new funding for local development (Chien, 2008).  From the viewpoint of the 
strategic governance concept of territorial competition only the participation of agents whose 
actions actually produce change at the local levelmust be considered.
Territorial intervention and action is mainly applied to plans and programmes at municipal, 
state or provincial  level, not discarding  that  intervention  from  the national sphere affectslocalised competitiveness. Yet not all competitive actions on the part of governments take the 
form of formal policies; they can be more specific and short term actions to achieve the goal 
of  a strategy.  A  range  of techniques and  instruments  exist  for  intervention  in a territory, 
although they might not be available in all the cases. The instruments for government action 
are subsidies to firms, local planning, administration of local externalities, inter and intra 
regional transportation, formation of clusters and the transfer of knowledge (Potter, 2009); 
taxation, organisation of public services, stimuli for immigration (Johansson, 2000). The use 
and combination of instruments will depend on the specific objectives or strategies. 
Chien (2008) distinguishes two types of strategies which entail different instruments. Growth 
enhancing strategies seek innovations to reduce inefficiency and improve goods and services 
that  they provide; they use initiatives such  as  labour training, support to  firms start ups, 
provision  of  business  advice,  provision  of  internal  and  external  networking,  knowledge 
development, and construction of infrastructure. The provision of hard and soft infrastructures 
is a method of creating and promoting new spaces of production. Other strategies adopt a 
growth depleting position by  giving all  manner of  incentives to  corporations such as tax 
abatements,  reduced  prices  for  services  and  infrastructure,  reduced  environmental  and 
regulatory standards.  Poot  (2000)  adds  to the latter  type of instruments  credits,  financial 
incentives, and  free or subsidized information and consultancy.  Poot  (2000)  stresses  that 
incentive-based territorial  competition  is l ikely to be particularly  fierce  in  contexts  where 
local authorities have a considerable discretionary power and that incentives can involve large 
amounts of public money. 
Strategic territorial competition action which would be growth enhancing is difficult to reach
in view of the heterogeneity of interest involved, often conflicting, on the part of local actors 
and  even  external  agents.  There  is  also  a  multiplicity  of  intervention  alternatives  and 
objectives.  One also has to allow  for  the context  in  the  implementation  of strategies  to 
consider the  kind  of  territory because  central,  intermediate and peripheral  territories need 
different platforms for competing. Local actions and responses are therefore very complex.
Chien  and  Gordon  (2008)  stress that often competition  focused very  heavily  on  inward 
investment rather than promotion of competitive advantage for existing (local) firms.
Mädling  (2006)  also  calls  attention  to  the  vertical  competition  between  the  tiers  of
administration (i.e. central, state and local) for power, money and optimum distribution of 
responsibilities.  Territorial planning  by  means of government  action  responds not only to 
local  interests  and  necessities but  to  interests  from  other  territorial  levels.  There  is also 
competition between political parties for power in a territory, between individuals as political actors  for  office,  careers,  and  success,  between  groups  or  individuals  due  to  sectorally 
organised  interests  and  even between organisations r epresenting  the  interest of  economic 
activities, producers or consumers.All this adds complexity. 
Outcomes from competition action
Outcomes from competition can be a variety of economic, social and political indicators that 
are brought about. Batey and Friederich (2000) suggest indicators related to technical and 
technological progress (knowledge and human capital formation, establishment of high tech 
firms, formation of clusters, research and development activities); productivity or efficiency 
(profits and  budget  surpluses);  costs  reductions  (labour,  strike,  investment,  tax  burden, 
communication, promotion and political losses); fluctuations in competition (welfare change, 
migration, change in centrality, functional reforms or change in competitive positions); goals 
of economic policies like product and employment, policy makers goal achievement (income, 
production,  global  profits,  tax  revenues,  employment  created,  firms  attracted); state  or 
municipal performance (social welfare, tax base, budget situation, votes, laws, competencies,
quantity  and  quality  of  services  and  infrastructure); quality  of  the  territory  reflected  in 
residential  value,  value  of  leisure,  quality  of  location,  quality  of  environment,  political 
institutions  reliability;  or  individual economic  aims  (profits,  income,  infrastructures  and 
services). Other  indicators  of  results  can be shares in n ational  product  (Maneval,  2000),
efficiency indicators (Reggiani, Nijkamp, y Sabella, 2000), summary indicators such as that 
proposed by Sobrino (2003) and immigration.
In  accordance  with  Chien and  Gordon  (2008)  all  competitive activity has uneven spatial, 
sectoral and individual effects and is likely to be redistributive within and across territories.
From  the  spatial  perspective  subnational  competition  results  can  be  pure  waste  for  the 
country, diversionary with zero-sum national results, and positive-sum outcomes nationally. 
However as  territorial  competition  is only concerned  with  local  efficiency,  and not  with 
spatial equity evaluation of territorial competition would be strictly on a region by region 
basis and relative to others. Chien and Gordon (2008) distinguish between three categories of 
territorially  competitive  action  depending on  the  results  for  the  region:  purely  wasteful, 
involving expenditure without any gains; zero-sum balance of costs and gains accruing for 
different groups; and those producing positive net additions to growth and welfare. Cheshire 
and  Gordon  (1998)  find  that  policies  that help established  firms  to  face contraction and 
expand are more effective, and their impact stronger than those policies aim at attracting new firms or immigrating firms. Eventually the former policies are also effective for the purpose 
of firm attraction. 
With respect to incentive-based competition when it has no constraints a race to the bottom is 
particularly likely. The symbolic policies pursued in the absence of collective action can also
be pure-waste  (Chien  and  Gordon,  2008).  These authors  also  explain that  the  distinction 
between categories of results can be arbitrary and that always there are gains for some agents, 
even  if  just  government  officials  or  firms,  although  the  costs  of  such  benefits  exceed 
nationwidebenefits.  
II. Territorial competition in Mexico
The opening up of the economy and the operation of territorial competition 
Globalisation has been assumed to imply fundamental changes for subnational territories. For 
instance, due to advancements in transport and telecommunications territories tend to become 
more ubiquitous from the point of view of factors of territorial attraction. Traditional location 
factors have lost relevance and now every territory is a locational alternative for almost all 
economic activity as long as it provides what firms and industries require. Trade liberalisation 
is another channel for increased opportunities and challenges in order to position products and 
services in worldwide markets. As a result competitiveness is used as a powerful device to 
foster attractiveness and economic efficiency. Under the competitiveness initiative regions 
and localities must incorporate processes that generate or increase local advantages mainly 
through actions of regional policy (Delgadillo, 2008). According to Dunning, the opening up 
of economies has implied for regional policy makers the challenge of providing resources and 
capabilities inside their jurisdiction in order to be competitive and “successful”. Such regional 
attributes have to be perceived by national and foreign owned firms at least as attractive 
complements to their own ownership-specific advantages as those offered by other regions.
1
In  the  case  of  Mexico  North  American  integration,  formalised  by  means  of  the  North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, United States and Mexico, is 
perhaps  the  most  emblematic  representation  of  globalisation.  NAFTA  seems  to  have 
promoted an intensified  competition between subnational  regions and states,  for  instance 
through actions and programmes aimed at influencing the competitive position and economic 
power of regions. Wong (1997) argues that under NAFTA’s institutional framework states, 
municipalities and cities in Mexico compete for promoting economic development, expand 
                                                  
1 Cited by Trejo (2007: 290).exports and attract investment. In this context it can be argued that NAFTA was a major 
stimulus for active territorial competition not only domestic but international. 
Subnational territorial competition in Mexico seems to have developed under a logic in which 
regions have mainly concentrated on the attraction of mobile investment, frequently FDI. The 
Mexican  style  competition  is  what  Chien  (2008)  identify  as  incentive  based  territorial 
competition which can actually be growth depleting. The particular federalist system and the 
opening up of the economy probably determine to an important extent the functioning and the 
extent of competition among Mexican regions. In theory with NAFTA every region had the 
possibility to insert actively in the export oriented model. However the competition between 
regions  and  its  intensification  due  to  globalisation  depicts  a  complexity  of  actors  and 
motivations which leads to very asymmetric prospects.  The dominance of Distrito Federal, 
which is known as DF and contains the capital city, during the closed-economy model of 
development performed by Mexico between the 1950s and 1970s is a well-known fact. DF 
together  with  Nuevo  Leon  and  Jalisco  represent  the  traditionally most  industrialised  and 
developed states. In the protectionist period the economic activity concentrated there and to a 
less extent in Estado de Mexico (DF’s neighbour). Those were the most representative and 
dynamic  regional  economies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  in-bond  industry  or  maquiladoras 
appeared in Mexico in the mid-1960s as part of the industrial promotion implemented in the 
north of the country. Federal subsidies encouraged the rapid growth of industrial parks in 
cities at the US border which underpinned the manufacturing base in the north. Later in the 
late  1970’s states  in  the Bajio (a  corridor between  DF  and the north) started to undergo
substantial economic expansion. In contrast the south has historically remained marginal to 
industrialisation and development. 
Wong (1997) indicates that the combination of structural changes in the economy and society 
gave  rise  to  some  emerging  regionalisms  that  stimulate  very  different  objectives  and 
motivations. There have been local actions and movements in the south of the country
2 whose 
objectives refer to social demands such as the improvement of wellbeing and quality of life, 
the elimination of an ethnic-politic domination between local stakeholders, local autonomy, 
democracy, and the local administration of resources. Trejo (2007) points out that although 
                                                  
2 In  1994  an  indigenous  movement  in  the  southern  state  of  Chiapas  emerged  whereas  in  2006  a  political 
upheaval took place in Oaxaca, another southern region. ethnic and political in principle the detonation of such events keep some relation with the 
economic backwardness that prevails in the south. In contrast, the most dominant public and 
private actors  in the north attempt  to  take  advantage  of  integration  and  globalisation  to 
maximise economic gains. However in general all states, guided by the interests of the more 
powerful political and economic local elites engaged in an intense competition for inward 
investment and export markets in order to reach economic benefits, which not spread to all 
economic and social groups. 
Elites take action and establish strategies of promotion of their “territories” or products due to 
recognition of the consequence of international trade and FDI for economic growth in the 
presence of domestic restrictions for employment and capital creation. In accordance with 
Chien and Gordon (2008) where competition is not routinised, Mexico as an example, these 
biases in group interests are expected and competition offers an element of monopoly profits 
to a small group of stakeholders. Inaction of a number of groups or just symbolic action is 
also usual.        
On the other hand, similar to many federalist systems, there is a principle of equalisation in 
the state and local government revenue sharing system. Mäding (2006) argues that there is no 
incentive for a territory to become a location for production if the burdens have to be borne 
locally but the revenue is spread evenly through compensatory allocations. However regions
keep competing for investment if they expect a significant impact on jobs.  Political logic also 
dictates that the attraction of investment tends to increase popularity and votes. Regions also 
compete having other motivations such as the attraction of residents because of the impact of 
population  figures on the budget through the equalisation system (although  it  is  also  be 
possible that attracting residents is of no benefit for the local budget). 
Trejo (2007) argues that unlike countries where there are prescribed and formal mechanisms 
at the local level to offer explicit incentives for attracting firms, the limits of federalism in 
Mexico has induced regional authorities to use informal or no systematised means to attract 
investments and promote  their  territories. Such  methods are often subject to discretional 
powers of regional authorities. There might be resources announced for social welfare but in 
practice redirected to support private investment projects. Therefore there is not a systematic 
view on the legitimate instrument which can be used to implement competition strategies. 
Wong  (1997)  points out that  the strategies  and  actions  are highly diverse ranging  from 
advertising campaigns, the creation of offices for economic promotion, regional plans and 
programmes for strategic action, infrastructure construction, provision of land, programmes of technical training for workers, credits, fiscal incentives, money for relocation, deregulation, 
programmes of administrative simplification, and so on.    
To the extent that governments make use of public resources to attract investment to their 
respective  territories, under  this  incentive based principle, competition can  have negative
result for spatial development, regional equity  and even for efficiency if it is diversionary (by 
attracting investment that could take place in alternative locations), if the benefits for the 
hosting state  are limited  to the creation of indirect  jobs but  there  are  little technological 
spillovers, or if public funds are used at discretion to attract investment in detriment of local 
welfare because these forms rarely increase the region-specific assets (Trejo, 2007). 
Hence, similar to the Chinese case, Mexican municipalities, states and cities seek to accrue 
the greatest amount of resources and bargain for the most favourable concession from the 
central government. Afterwards competition focuses heavily on incentive based attraction of 
inward investment rather than on the creation of competitiveness assets. In addition, territorial 
competition operates with minimal top-down regulation and with very few legal constraints. 
Furthermore the scarce local financial autonomy represents an important restriction for action. 
Performance results ofMexican regions
We present the results of four indicators that might be reflecting the results of the type of 
competition performed by Mexican regions: Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP pc), 
interstate net migration,  Foreign  Direct  Investment  inflows  per  capita  (FDI  pc)  and  a 
competition index.
3 These reveal to an extent the capacity to attract and retain people and 
investment, the productivity and the overall performance of the economy in each region. Data 
is obtained from the economic data bank of INEGI the agency which produces the official 
statistics in Mexico and CONAPO which is the National Council of Population.
If  we  reduce  motivations  of  territorial  competition  to these  economic  goals  -naturally 
followed by local governments, existing economic elites and other private and public actors 
but likely not by all existing stakeholders, evaluate the results and consider the outcomes on a 
comparative basis we observe that the results are mixed and heterogeneous as some states 
perform well according to one or more indicators but not in the four of them. Taking the 
average between 1996 and 2006 for each state we observe that Distrito Federal has the highest 
levels of FDI pc and GDP pc followed by Nuevo Leon. The difference in the FDI pc however 
is considerable between Distrito Federal and the other states. The average annual FDI pc 
across regions in this period is of approximately 80 US dollars, Distrito Federal registers more 
                                                  
3 This index is taken from Sobrino (2003).than 800 dollars, Nuevo Leon 340 dollars, and at the other end are Chiapas and Oaxaca with 
less than 1 dollar. In total there are only six states above the average and all of them, with the 
exception of Distrito Federal, are located in the north of the country (table 1).
Table 1. Performance indicators by state, average between 1996 and 2006.
FDI pc*  GDP pc*  Net immigration rate**  Competition Index*** 
Distrito Federal (C) 0.83 Distrito Federal (C) 3.00 Quintana Roo (S) 1.87   Chihuahua (N) 1
Nuevo León (N) 0.34 Nuevo León (N) 2.14 Baja California Sur (N) 1.57   Coahuila (N) 2
Baja California (N) 0.25 Campeche (S) 1.92 Baja California (N) 1.18   Nuevo León (N) 3
Baja California Sur (N) 0.24 Quintana Roo (S) 1.81 Querétaro (C ) 0.68   Querétaro (C ) 4
Chihuahua (N) 0.18 Chihuahua (N) 1.71 Colima (C ) 0.54   Tamaulipas (N) 5
Tamaulipas (N) 0.09 Coahuila (N) 1.70 Zacatecas (C ) 0.52   Sonora (N) 6
Quintana Roo 0.07 Baja California (N) 1.58 Tamaulipas (N) 0.52   Aguascalientes (C ) 7
Sonora 0.07 Baja California Sur (N) 1.53 Aguascalientes (C ) 0.50   México (C ) 8
Querétaro 0.06 Sonora (N) 1.48 Morelos (C ) 0.41   Baja California (N) 9
Aguascalientes 0.06 Aguascalientes (C) 1.47 Estado de México (C ) 0.34   Guanajuato (C ) 10
Jalisco 0.06 Querétaro (C) 1.42 Nuevo León (N) 0.29   Puebla 11
Coahuila  0.06 Tamaulipas (N) 1.30 Tlaxcala (C ) 0.27   San Luis Potosí 12
Estado de México 0.06 Colima (C) 1.25 Chihuahua (N ) 0.27   Durango 13
Puebla 0.05 Jalisco (C) 1.19 Hidalgo (C ) 0.25   Yucatán 14
Morelos 0.04 Morelos 1.10 Nayarit (C) 0.23   Baja California Sur 15
Nayarit 0.04 Durango 1.06 Campeche (S) 0.23   Tlaxcala 16
San Luis Potosí 0.03 Sinaloa 0.98 Sonora 0.11   Michoacán 17
Durango 0.03 México 0.97 Yucatán 0.06   Jalisco 18
Tlaxcala 0.02 Yucatán 0.96 Guanajuato 0.05   Quintana Roo 19
Guanajuato 0.02 Guanajuato 0.93 Coahuila 0.02   Colima 20
Tabasco 0.02 San Luis Potosí 0.91 Jalisco 0.02   Morelos 21
Yucatán 0.02 Puebla 0.82 Puebla 0.00   Distrito Federal 22
Colima 0.01 Hidalgo 0.74 San Luis Potosí -0.08   Veracruz 23
Campeche 0.01 Tabasco 0.74 Michoacán -0.08   Zacatecas 24
Sinaloa 0.01 Nayarit 0.73 Durango -0.20   Guerrero 25
Veracruz  0.01 Veracruz  0.72 Oaxaca -0.25   Sinaloa 26
Guerrero 0.00 Zacatecas 0.71 Sinaloa -0.31   Hidalgo 27
Zacatecas 0.00 Michoacán 0.71 Chiapas -0.34   Tabasco 28
Hidalgo 0.00 Tlaxcala 0.65 Tabasco -0.39   Oaxaca 29
Michoacán 0.00 Guerrero 0.64 Veracruz  -0.40   Chiapas 30
Oaxaca 0.00 Chiapas 0.52 Guerrero -0.44   Campeche 31
Chiapas 0.00 Oaxaca 0.51 Distrito Federal -0.96   Nayarit 32
Average 0.08 1.18 0.20
Coeficient of variation 1.89 0.46 2.82
Source: Own calculations with information from CONAPO and INEGI.
*Thousands US dollars. 
**Percentage
*** RankingThere are also striking differences in GDP pc but to a lesser extent than in FDI pc as shown 
by a lower value on the coefficient of variation. In addition to Distrito Federal and Nuevo 
Leon  there are other states  above the average. Among  them  there  is  a  majority  of states 
located in the north and the centre excepting Campeche, whose result is biased due to its oil 
production reflected in its GDP but whose rents go to the federation, and Quintana Roo. In 
this latest  case the state´s dynamism is guided  by  the existence  of  a foremost  touristic 
destination Cancun. 
Net migration rates show that Distrito Federal is not attracting population but is the state with 
the lowest net immigration. This shows the existence of some congestion effect given that DF 
is the most densely populated region and belongs to one of the biggest metropolitan cores in 
the world, Mexico City Metropolitan area which has over 20 million inhabitants. Quintana 
Roo, Baja California Sur and Baja California have the highest net immigration rates. The first 
two have based its attractiveness on the development of worldwide class touristic complexes, 
Cancun and Los Cabos respectively. Distrito Federal ranks 22 in the competition index, in 
contrast with its leading position in the levels of GDP pc and FDI pc, whereas Chihuahua, 
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro and Tamaulipas are at the top of the ranking.  
As globalisation brings about  a new significance of  access to international  markets  and 
investment  then the  location of  regions can be strategic for  promoting  and  “marketing” 
regions. Due to North American integration the US is the main export market and the main 
origin of FDI for Mexico. Therefore it has been argued that states closer to that country, those 
in the North, have a further advantage over states further down. Figure 1 shows at the upper 
left side how all the states behave in the ranking of the four indicators we calculated and we 
see differences among the four rankings. In order to have a better idea of the differences in the 
four rankings for each state and to observe any pattern of good or bad performance according 
to their location we use a crude classification of states locating in the north, centre and south.
The Centre includes 15 states which show clear heterogeneity. In most cases they tend to rank 
between the intermediate and low places, with the exception of Distrito Federal in GDP and 
FDI  pc.  Queretaro shows  acceptable performance  in all  four  indicators situated  fourth  in 
immigration rates and competition index, ninth in FDI pc and eleventh in GDP pc. In the 
North there are 9 states and is less heterogeneous. In general states situate from middle to top 
of the ranking excluding Sinaloa and Durango. In contrast with the other states these two are 
not at the border with the US. Nuevo Leon performs well in GDP, FDI and competition 
indicators, and has a positive net immigration. The South clearly is the less diverse group although showing the lowest performance. Quintana Roo is the exception because has the 
highest immigration rate, and a good position in GDP and FDI. In contrast, Chiapas and 
Oaxaca are in the lowest positions. Therefore geographic location in the north or the south 
produces some influence on performance but conclusions in this regard is not obvious for 
states in the Centre. Obviously location does not determine completely winners and losers but 
multiple factors impinge on performance. 
Figure 1. Rank position of Mexican States according to performance indicators and location  
    
Source: Own calculations with information from CONAPO and INEGI.
III. The nature of the federal system in México and regional revenues
In  this section  we  describe briefly the  federal system  in Mexico  as  well  as  the different 
sources of income and grants that states and municipalities have in order to perform their 
functions.  This  revenue provides them  with  the  financial  capability  to  conduct different 
actions. The Mexican federation includes 31 states plus a Federal District and over 2,400 local 
governments. There is an intergovernmental transfer arrangement that was first established in 
1980 with the creation of the National System of Fiscal Coordination. Under this programme 
states restrained their own taxing authority in return of unconditional transfers (Courchene 
and Díaz-Cayeros, 2000).
Until 1997 the most important element in the transfer system was the unconditional revenue 
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FDI pc (96 -06) GDPpc (96 -06) Net migration rate (96 -06) Competition Index (93 -06)percentage of the assignable or shared taxes (income and value-added taxes in addition to 
ordinary fees from oil). Nowadays the most important funds are the general fund (allocated on 
an equalisation basis and using a formula), the fund for supporting municipalities and specific 
federal taxes (vehicle use tax and the new vehicles tax) that are fully transferred to the states 
on  a  case-by-case basis. These  funds  are  complemented by other special taxes and  other 
revenue sharing (Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros, 2000; Moreno, 2003).     
In 1998 there was an important reform in the transfer programme and a new item was created 
in  the  federal  budget.  The  Item  33  are  conditional  funds transferred  to  states  and 
municipalities to finance expenditure programmes that were decentralised to states -education 
and health, or to municipalities -basic local infrastructure (Moreno, 2003).  There are several 
specific funds the largest amount corresponding to basic education; most of all funds are 
allocated  under  the  equalisation  criterion  excepting  the  Municipal  social  infrastructure 
transfer and the State social infrastructure transfer which are compensatory funds.  
Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros (2000) find that overall richer states in Mexico receive larger 
per capita  revenue sharing  than poorer states  whereas poorer states  tend  to obtain  larger 
conditional transfers. They argue  that the  allocation  formula  for basic education  transfers 
discriminates against states that use their own revenues to finance this aspect.  
A different  important part of federal  grants  is f ederal  public  investment  which  is aim  at 
specific projects considered important by federal government and as such is subject to high 
degree of discretion. On the other hand, state and local public revenue is supplemented by 
own-source  revenues.  These  two  funds  are  however  not  part  of  the  transfer  system 
(Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros, 2000). States and municipalities own revenue base is pretty
weak.  Therefore sub national governments  are  heavily dependent on  federal  aid and less 
reliant on local tax to get more own resources.  According to Moreno (2003) the expected 
benefits from decentralization do not emerge if the transfer system creates wrong incentives, 
and discourage local governments from raising own-source revenues. In the long run this 
prevents  the  development  of  an  adequate  local  governmental  capacity and  has  negative 
implications for local governance. Therefore subnational governments in Mexico might not be 
building an adequate institutional capacity.
Furthermore  even  if  the  federal system  seems to encourage  the  implementation  of  local 
autonomy principles, the reality still show an important gap between theory and practice. 
There have been intergovernmental conflicts on a variety of bases including areas of shared 
responsibility; e.g. although municipalities have legal full-fledged status states continue to 
enforce their participation in some local affairs. In addition the federal structure operates in a way that programs a nd  financing (conditional  grants  and  unconditional  revenue sharing) 
intended for the municipalities are channelled through the states. 
IV. Discriminant analysis of federal transfers and competition outcomes in Mexico
Local  governments  need  financial  resources  in  addition  to  managerial  capacities  for  the 
formulation of competition strategies of diverse nature. Therefore local public funds and the 
way they are exploited is an important instrument of local government action. According to 
the literature review in section I, generally winning regions are those with local governments 
that  are  financially  and  managerially  capable  of  exploiting  the available  resources.  This 
section addresses the relationship between financial capabilities and competition results of 
Mexican  states.  Particularly  we analyse  the  relationship  between  public  local  revenue  -
transfers and own  revenue- on the  performance of Mexican states  while  considering  also 
federal  public  investment  in  order  to  contribute  to  the  empirical  literature  on  territorial 
competition on a specific institutional context. We use discriminant analysis as a statistical 
method, similar  to regression  analysis, which can be used to understand the  relationship 
between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables.
In discriminant analysis the dependent variable is a categorical variable whose value indicates 
a group to which a subject (a state in this case) belongs. We classify Mexican states in three 
categories according to their rank position in the indicator of performance results. States from 
place 1 to 10 are high performers (H) and belong to group 1; from position 11 to 20 are 
intermediate  performers  (I)  and belong to group 2; and  from  position  21  to 32  are  low 
performers (L) and belong to group 3. The independent variables are:  (1) Unconditional 
transfers per capita (UT or ítem 28); (2) Conditional transfers per capita (CT or ítem 33); (3) 
Own revenue per capita (OR); and (4) Federal Public Investment per capita (FPI). We must 
emphasise that in reality states have more autonomy on unconditional transfers and are totally 
autonomous for managing their own revenue and in consequence their financial capacity for 
competition action has more to do with these two variables. However, the assets created by 
means of federal investment and conditional transfers can impinge on performance outcomes. 
In  our case discriminant  analysis  allows  us two  things,  firstly  to  assess how  well  the 
independent variables (discriminating variables) separate the categories H, I and L; secondly, 
to know which independent variables contribute more to explain the division
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The discriminant methodology includes further steps in which reclassification and predictions about the correct 
classification of additional observation are possible. However we do not implement those. Therefore  we  have  four  alternative  models each  one  corresponding  to  one  of  the  four 
performance  indicators’ groups as dependent  variable: Model  1  Competition  Index (CI);
Model 2 FDI pc, Model 3 GDP pc; and Model 4 Immigration ratio (IR). Once we have the 
groups  in e ach  model  we  implement discriminant  analysis  and table  2 presents  the  main 
results.
Table 2. Main results of discriminant analysis


















UT 0.410 0.276 0.220 1.022 0.107 0.493 -0.289 0.744
CT -0.510 0.249 -0.078 -0.792 0.122 -0.939 -0.650 -0.121
OR -0.441 -0.901 0.935 -0.612 0.917 0.054 -0.486 -0.995
PFI -0.892 0.128 -0.438 -0.602 0.293 -0.501 0.957 -0.205
Correlation 0.339 0.183 0.455 0.264 0.54 0.17 0.267 0.098
Discriminant 
capacity 11.49% 3.35% 20.70% 6.97% 29.16% 2.89% 7.13% 0.96%
Pr 0.0000 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0003 0.3409
Missclasified 185 196 191 189
(52.4%) (55.5%) (54.1%) (53.5%)
Source: Own elaboration
The first step in discriminant analysis is the estimation of coefficients to be applied to the
independent  variables  and  then  the  coefficients  are  used  to  construct the  discriminant 
function.  Our analysis  gives  two  discriminant  functions  for  each  model  and  the  F-tests 
associated with each function indicate that all of them, except the second function on the IR, 
are statistically significant at the 97 % level. We observe the maximum canonic correlations 
in function 1 of models 2 and 3 (raw 5) and which corresponds with highest discriminant 
capacity (raw 6). This means that the independent variables explain better the differences in 
performance regarding FDI and GDP per head (20.7% and 29.16% respectively). On the other 
hand, model 4 (IR) shows the lowest correlation and discriminant capacity of independent 
variables. However, we see that largely correlations in the four models are not very high.This 
indicates that even though local financial capacity might be significant to explain regional 
differences in competition results, it is not the only and most important factor.
                                                                                                                                                              The  first  function  of  discriminant  analysis  always  provides  the  highest  discriminatory 
capacity  and  so  we  concentrate  on  function  1  in  all  models.  Regarding  model  1  the 
standardised canonical coefficients indicate that the grouping by the CI is positively weighted 
by unconditional transfers and negative on conditional transfers, own resources and federal 
investment; the biggest coefficient on public investment says that this variable best explains 
the variability among groups. The second mo del is dominated by the own resources variable 
(0.93). Own resources and unconditional transfers relate positively with the FDI categories 
whereas  federal  investment and  conditional  transfers have  negative  impact.  The effect of 
conditional transfers is very small (-0.078).  In model 3 all discriminating variables have a 
positive impact on GDP categories but the strongest effect comes from the own resources 
(0.91) followed by federal investment (0.29). Finally estimations for model 4 show that only 
the  public  federal  investment  variable  has a positive  sign  and  a  strong  effect  on the 
discriminant function (0.95).   
These results are interpreted to indicate that the differences among group categories according 
to the competition index are mainly explained by federal investment, but the sign shows that 
the best performance corresponds  to those states  with  lowest  levels of  investment  which 
sounds odd.   T he differences  between  FDI  and  GDP  groups  are  best explained by own 
resources which are totally managed by local authorities and can be used, even discretionally, 
for  locally  based  purposes. In  the  last  model  estimations  reveal  that  differences  in  net 
immigration  rates  are  explained  by  the  levels  of  public  federal  investment. Therefore 
estimations  reflect  a polarised association among  the different dimensions of  local public 
resources and public federal investment, and performance groups depending on the indicator 
of performance we use.  
Lastly, the last raw in table 2 indicates that a big proportion of observation are misclassified 
when  considering  only  the  four  discriminating  variables  we  are  using.  This  shows  the 
restricted  power  of  the  dimension  of  local  financing  and  the  federal  investment  to 
discriminate among bad and good performers according to whichever performance indicator.  
V. Concluding remarks
The competitive paradigm put territories as local as well as global players. As such territories 
have strategies, objectives and a variety of instruments to reach some determined goals, and 
individually they have to evaluate their results always relative to other regions. From the 
perspective  of  this  paper  territorial  competition  is a n  integrated  process  whose  logic  is 
complex and multidimensional but has as an ultimate goal some economic, social or political gains within or among territories. At the subnational level regions, cities or localities might 
compete between them for different sources of consumption and production. The kind of 
competition they engaged in depends on their very specific contextual frame with regard to 
their position within the country and within the global system. The domestic context rests 
significantly on the characteristics of the political system and the kind of actions governments 
at various levels can and are willing to perform. This contextual aspect is criticalbecause of 
the influence of government to harmonise the various actors’ interests and actions. The global 
context  is essential  as  well  if  territories seek  to  insert  in i nternational  markets or attract 
foreign production or consumers.             
It has been the purpose of this paper to look at the specific case of territorial competition in 
Mexico and evaluate the regional performance effects that are likely to emerge. Based on the 
analytical  framework  we  use  performance  outcomes  among  competing  regions  depend 
significantly  on  the  financial  and  managerial  capabilities  of  local  governments,  not 
mentioning  the  effect  that  regional  policy at the  national  level  can  have. We employed
discriminant analysis to look at the effect of various dimensions of states’ financial sources on 
various measures of economic results controlling for regionally based federal investment. 
On the whole, as a consequence of increasing integration to the global economy states in 
Mexico, guided by the interests of the most powerful political and economic local elites, 
engaged in an intense competition for inward investment and export markets in order to reach 
economic  benefits. Likely  the  Mexican  style  competition  is  incentive  based and  low-
regulated. In terms of the results winners (best performers) and losers (worst performers) 
differ among different indicators and thus the interpretation about outcomes depends on the 
particular objective anticipated in each region. Overall the south of the country suffers from 
low  performance.  The  centre  but  mainly  the  north  is said to  benefit  from  geographical 
proximity to the US market and firms. 
The federal system in Mexico usually favour the backward regions with more conditional 
transfers  whereas  other  regions get more  unconditional  transfers  or have  more  financial 
autonomy by  means  of  more own  revenue.  On the other hand, public federal  investment 
depends strongly on the view of the federal government about critical necessities in different 
territories.     
Through very basic discriminant  analysis  we  find that although  financial  capabilities are 
statistically significant in explaining which states succeed in the competition process, their 
explanatory  power  is  incomplete and  its  effect  differs conditional  on  the  measures  of performance  we  employ  and  the  kind  of  revenue  (conditional,  unconditional,  own)  we 
consider. As we have mentioned an additional and very important aspect has to be with the 
managerial  abilities of  local public  actors.  In  this  regard  we  may argue  the  influence of 
financial resources employed by local governments for increasing competitiveness is limited 
by the nature of the spending and in this case we would confirm a case of incentive based 
competition  that can be pure  waste  for some territories or nationally.  Further  research  is 
needed in order to incorporate other dimensions of governments’ capabilities into the analysis 
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